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The purges in the state apparatus which have been underway in Turkey since the failed military 
coup represent a decisive stage in the construction of a ‘new Turkey’, involving both the final 
elimination of the remaining elements of the old Kemalist establishment and the crackdown 
on the group centred around Fethullah Gülen, a preacher and former government ally accused 
of plotting the coup. The authorities view him as the greatest threat. In a broader context, 
the aim of the purges is to ultimately replace the present elites with new ones. This may lead 
to the elimination of any conceivable opposition capable of threatening the rule of President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
The interim measures taken by the authorities involve the elimination of their enemies and 
the strengthening of both the President’s rule and his personal control of key institutions 
(the announced constitutional reform and the introduction of a presidential system will seal the 
change which is happening right now). As a result of the purges, a unique revolution in person-
nel is taking place. The dismissed officials are being replaced with those who benefited from 
the period of government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which lasted more than 
a decade, and with representatives of the old republican elites who are expected to contribute 
to the creation of the new order. They are considered necessary for maintaining the continuity 
of the functioning of public institutions. The scale and momentum of this replacement, as well 
as its institutional backbone, suggest that this is a revolutionary process which will lead to the 
emergence of a new political order. 
Fethullah Gülen  
– public enemy number one
The attempted coup of 15 July 2016 was carried 
out  as a military coup. The army had until then 
been considered one of the major forces able 
to threaten Erdoğan and a potential alternative 
to his rule. However, these events have become 
a pretext for the authorities to carry out the ul-
timate crackdown on the Fethullah Gülen move-
ment – a group the authorities consider their 
most dangerous opponent (see Appendix). The 
true scale of Gülen’s influence in the Turkish 
military is difficult to ascertain, even though he 
might have played a part in plotting the coup. 
The authorities have used the attempt to over-
throw the government to ultimately discredit 
and eliminate whatever influence the charis-
matic preacher holds within state structures. 
The purges, which have been underway since 
the coup attempt across the entire state appa-
ratus, are a continuation1 of the campaign tar-
1 Until 2013, Fethullah Gülen used to be Erdoğan’s main 
ally. In December 2013, a rift occurred between the 
government and the movement, resulting from a cor-
ruption scandal involving four ministers and Erdoğan’s 
closest collaborators. Since then, the movement has 
been viewed as a ‘parallel state’, aiming to overthrow 
the democratically elected government. For more see 
Dexter Filkins, Turkey’s Thirty-Year Coup, New Yorker, 
17 October 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2016/10/17/turkeys-thirty-year-coup
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geting the group centred around Gülen, which 
has been ongoing for several months now.
Actions by the authorities directed at Gülen’s 
supporters, of which the precise numbers of 
those who infiltrated the state apparatus are dif-
ficult to estimate, have reached unprecedented 
proportions in the history of the modern Turkish 
state. One of the main reasons for the purges be-
ing on such a large scale seems to be the amor-
phous nature of the Gülen movement (no for-
mal membership structure, non-homogeneous 
social base, non-transparent mechanism of per-
sonal, financial and political connections) and its 
massive reach (the number of active members 
across the world is estimated at 3–6 million2, in-
cluding around 1 million in Turkey3 alone).
The purges took the form of a series of meas-
ures carried out on a mass scale and having 
a pre-emptive nature. By 5 November 2016, 
more than 34,000 people had been arrested, 
more than 105,000 civil servants had been dis-
missed and 3,600 judges and public prosecu-
tors had been removed from their posts. Most 
of the individuals affected by repressive meas-
ures are accused of supporting the organisers 
of the coup. Other areas of the state apparatus 
covered by the repressive measures include: the 
education sector (more than 6,000 academ-
ics and 20,000 teachers were dismissed, more 
than 2,000 educational institutions having 
been closed down) and the media (in all, 186 
2 Murat Bilgincan, Everything you’ve ever wanted to know 
about Fethullah Gulen, Turkey’s most controversial 
cleric, Al-Monitor, 19 April 2016, http://www.al-mon-
itor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/turkey-fethullah-gu-
len-cleric-opposition-erdogan-akp.html
3 Maciej Kochanowicz, Turcja. Gülen i Erdogan. Kruk kru-
kowi oko wykole, Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 August 2016.
newspapers, TV stations, web portals etc. were 
closed down; 142 journalists were arrested)4. 
Up until now, both the education sector and 
the media had been the target of particularly 
intensive actions by the Gülen movement – the 
confrontation in this field between the govern-
ment and the movement began in 2013. Over 
the following years, educational institutions of-
fering private follow-up courses for prospective 
students (the so-called dershane) were closed 
down and media holdings associated with the 
movement were gradually taken over. These 
included daily newspapers and TV stations 
(the biggest of them being Koza Ipek and Feza 
Gazetecilik, taken over in October 2015 and in 
March 2016, respectively).
The failed coup served merely as a catalyst or 
even a pretext for the authorities to carry out 
a final crackdown on the movement. The gov-
ernment began to view the movement as an 
extreme threat back in December 20135. The 
reason for this was its mass-scale nature and 
the fact that its goal involved educating new 
Muslim elites and transforming the Turkish state 
and society in a process referred to as the “long 
march”. This was also the reason behind the 
large presence of Gülen’s supporters in various 
state structures. Due to the movement’s amor-
phous nature the authorities decided to elimi-
nate its members in a large-scale campaign and 
to simultaneously launch repressive measures 
against individuals who were merely suspected 
of having ties to the group considered hostile 
towards the government. To illustrate the scale 
of abuse associated with the purges it is suffi-
cient to quote the fact that since the coup at-
tempt the Constitutional Court (from which two 
judges were removed in the purge campaign) 
received more than 40,000 complaints (which 
4 Data after the analysis prepared by the authors of the web-
site turkeypurge.com, updated every two weeks. The num-
bers quoted refer to the situation as on 5 November 2016. 
See http://turkeypurge.com/
5 Marek Matusiak, Turkey: former allies in conflict, OSW Anal-
yses, 8 January 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikac-
je/analyses/2014-01-08/turkey-former-allies-conflict 
Although the attempted coup was a mili-
tary coup, the purges are directed at the 
Gülen movement, considered by the au-
thorities to be the greatest threat.
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was considerably more than the average annu-
al number of complaints estimated at 20,000)6. 
The army is cornered
One of the most significant consequences of the 
failed military coup involves actions by the gov-
ernment directed at the army. The thwarting of 
the attempt to overthrow the government by 
the supporters of the authorities has revealed 
the lack of homogeneity within the military, the 
lack of public support, and the ultimate rever-
sal of the system which had hitherto operated 
since the beginning of the Turkish Republic. In 
this system, it was precisely the military that 
served as the conciliation force in Turkish pol-
itics. Despite this, the relations between the 
government and the army remain tense and 
it seems that the authorities continue to view 
the army, which they depend upon, as a threat.
Immediately after the coup, 30% of the gener-
als and admirals were dismissed and 15,000 ser-
vicemen were arrested. Until recently, in his pol-
icy Erdoğan strove to build influence within the 
army by stepping up his control of it and carrying 
out personnel reshuffles. The President had lim-
ited opportunities to influence a change in the 
ideology prevalent within the army. En masse, 
the army remains largely secular and nationalist. 
Moreover, the military leaders continue to nur-
ture the feeling that they are the main guardians 
of the heritage of the Kemalist republic. 
The purges carried out by the authorities have 
significantly strengthened the position of the 
6 Constitutional Court receives over 40,000 individual peti-
tions since coup attempt, 17 October 2016, https://www.
turkishminute.com/2016/10/17/constitutional-court-re-
ceives-40000-individual-petitions-since-coup-attempt/
government versus the army. At the same time, 
they have enabled the army to smoothly trans-
form to a new order which is being shaped 
anew (and under control of the authorities). 
A dramatic decline in the army’s prestige has 
become the main reason for servicemen to ex-
press their loyalty to the government and to 
consent to the unprecedented increase in civil-
ian control over the armed forces.
Both sides have acted in an extremely cautious 
manner. In the current situation, it may be stat-
ed that the government’s actions are aimed 
at encircling an enemy which continues to be 
dangerous. The army continues to be a her-
metic and a relatively homogeneous structure 
in terms of ideology. However, its image has 
eroded dramatically, which is why its represent-
atives interpret the events that happened in 
mid-July as directed at the government and at 
the armed forces equally7. In this way, the army 
is demonstrating its loyalty to the government 
and is involved in active cooperation with it, as 
proved by the participation of Turkish troops 
in Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syr-
ia and their readiness to get involved in oper-
ations in Mosul. Erdoğan, for his part, cannot 
be sure of the army’s loyalty, and, according to 
some reports, he sees another coup attempt by 
representatives of the military as a real threat8. 
In this configuration, the strengthening of the 
government’s position is progressing in the fol-
lowing manner: aside from their participation in 
the operation targeting the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), which has been ongoing since July 
2015 in the south-eastern part of the country, 
the armed forces are involved in the operation in 
Syria and some troops are being relocated to the 
7 Cf. the statement by former head of General Staff İlker 
Başbuğ, sentenced in one of the show trials, later re-
leased from prison when cooperation between Erdoğan 
and Gülen ended. Başbuğ: Bunu yapanlar asker değil, 
terörist, Diken, 17 July 2016, http://www.diken.com.
tr/eski-genelkurmay-baskani-basbug-darbeyi-yapan-
lar-asker-degil-terorist/
8 Cf. Kadri Gürsel, Musul’u almak için savaşa mı gidiy-
oruz?, Cumhuriyet, 7 October 2016, http://kadrigursel.
com/Musulu-almak-icin-savasa-mi-gidiyoruz/7206
According to military officials, the mid-July 
events were directed equally at the armed 
forces and at the government.
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border with Iraq. Alongside this, the army is be-
ing treated as an essential partner, which by its 
involvement in these operations can save its de-
teriorating image, avoid a deep reorganisation 
and the threat of losing its privileges and take 
part in the shaping of the new political order. 
The army command has consented to further 
actions aimed at fully subordinating the armed 
forces to civilian government – the General 
Staff will be controlled by the President, the 
command of specific forces will be taken over 
by the Ministry of Defence, secondary military 
schools will be closed down. Moreover, the gen-
erals have allowed the graduates of imam-hatip 
schools (officially, secular general secondary 
schools albeit with an advanced religion curric-
ulum, which educate future imams and hatips, 
i.e. preachers in mosques9) to join the army. 
Military academies for their part will be taken 
over by the Ministry of Education. These are un-
precedented measures to which the generals 
have consented in exchange for restoring and 
promoting to the rank of general those colonels 
who were sentenced in the show court trials, 
Balyoz and Ergenekon (as a result of these tri-
als, held in 2008–2012, several hundred officers 
were expelled and sentenced – see Appendix). 
Owing to the recent series of reshuffles in the 
army, ten colonels sentenced in the above-men-
tioned trials were promoted to the rank of gen-
eral and appointed members of the Supreme 
Military Council. Among the promoted officers 
9 This move can be considered a fundamental change. 
The authorities had tried to achieve this long before the 
coup, although they always met with major resistance. 
Cf. Gonul Tol, Turkey’s Next Military Coup, Foreign Af-
fairs, 30 May 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar-
ticles/2016-05-30/turkeys-next-military-coup
there are individuals stemming from the radical 
Kemalist wing of the army, which supports the 
Eurasian re-orientation in Turkish foreign policy10. 
The Turkish army also includes pro-Russian and 
anti-Western groups influenced by the ideology 
of Neoeurasianism that is promoted in Turkey by 
groups associated with the Patriotic Party (Vatan 
Partisi), whose ideology is a combination of Ke-
malism, secular nationalism and geopolitical con-
cepts devised by Russian ideologist Aleksandr 
Dugin11. Due to the alliance established on the 
initiative of the government, this group is gaining 
prominence at the expense of the officers educat-
ed in the West. Despite various gestures of unity 
and loyalty, mutual distrust between the army 
and the government continues to exist. Given the 
fact that both forces remain in fundamental ide-
ological opposition, this cooperation should be 
viewed as strictly temporary. 
The intelligence service – the key 
to ruling the new Turkey 
Due to the fact that Erdoğan can only depend 
on the army to a limited extent, the position 
of the National Intelligence Organisation (Turk-
ish: Milli İstihbarat Teşkilati – MIT) has been 
strengthened in recent months. The head of 
intelligence, Hakan Fidan, has long been con-
sidered one of the President’s favourites and 
his institution enjoys the President’s extraordi-
nary trust. It is being seen as key to building the 
new state order. Therefore, the actions carried 
out in recent months have led to a significant 
strengthening of the intelligence service.
For this to be possible, two other departments 
(supplementing the existing four) have been es-
tablished in the intelligence structures, with their 
10 Gonul Tol, Omer Taspinar, Erdogan’s Turn to the Kemal-
ists, Foreign Affairs, 27 October 2016, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-10-27/erdo-
gans-turn-kemalists?cid=soc-tw-rdr
11 Cf. Sezin Öney, 15 Temmuz Sonrası Türkiye’nin Yeni 
“Normal”I, Birikim Dergisi, 4 August 2016, http://www.
birikimdergisi.com/haftalik /7834/15-temmuz-sonra-
si-turkiye-nin-yeni-normal-i#.WCsu0Mm2pMw
The reconstruction of the state is to involve 
increased coordination of state institutions, 
while the intelligence service is to be trans-
formed into a unique ‘command centre’.
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heads occupying the rank of undersecretaries of 
state. The first new department is intended to 
coordinate cooperation between various state 
institutions, while the other is a department 
for special operations, mainly those carried out 
abroad with the involvement of the army12. 
The motivation behind the actions targeting 
the MIT stems from the assumption adopted 
by the authorities according to which the on-
going institutional reconstruction of the state is 
to be based on increased coordination of spe-
cific state institutions (mainly the office of the 
President and the government) and their close 
cooperation with the intelligence service. To 
achieve this, the authorities have been striving 
to open channels of communication between 
these institutions. The MIT for its part is to be 
transformed into a unique ‘command centre’.
The transformation described above is con-
nected with the emerging defence doctrine, 
which provides for carrying out pre-emptive 
and preventive strikes abroad. According to 
this assumption, threats to domestic security 
may come equally from inside Turkey and from 
abroad13. In the situation where the govern-
ment is forced to cooperate with the military, 
the MIT is becoming the main institution on 
which the president’s power is to be based. In 
the context of its expansion and enlargement 
of competences, it can be concluded that the 
12 Pinar Tremblay, Post-coup shake-up at Turkey’s intel-
ligence agency, Al-Monitor, 6 November 2016, http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/turkey-post-
botched-coup-shake-up-at-turkish-intelligence.html
13 Şaban Kardaş, Önleyici ve dönüştürücü yeni güvenlik 
doktrini, Yeni Şafak, 25 October 2016, http://www.yeni-
safak.com/hayat/onleyici-ve-donusturucu-yeni-guven-
lik-doktrini-2553195
intelligence service is becoming the key actor 
in both domestic and foreign policy. As such, it 
is expected to follow the policy of a unique ‘es-
cape into the future’ that Erdoğan has pursued 
for some time now.
The police and the judiciary – continu-
ation of the former situation
Aside from the actions carried out in key insti-
tutions, including the army and the intelligence 
service, the government in Ankara has gradual-
ly stepped up its control of the judiciary and the 
police. The purges that have been underway in 
these two institutions since July can be seen 
as a continuation of the crackdown which had 
started long before the attempted coup. In the 
present situation, the measures taken by the 
authorities have reached considerable propor-
tions. The personnel reshuffle also entails the 
opening of a path for the social advancement 
of AKP supporters, including those who actively 
objected to the coup and are willing to serve 
the state as it undergoes reconstruction14. On 
the other hand, due to the limited power base 
and the lack of competences on the part of the 
most loyal supporters, officers stemming from 
outside conservative groups (as broadly under-
stood) are also being recruited. They represent 
such political views as centre right, nationalist 
and even liberal. This type of personnel policy 
is intended to minimise the threat posed by 
the Gülen movement and to expand the power 
base of the ruling party. In this way, the present 
project of constructing the new order is gaining 
an international dimension and a mass reach.
So far, the Gülen movement has managed to 
build its greatest influence within the police 
14 This is proved by the fact that around 280,000 individu-
als applied for joining the police special forces, whereas 
there are plans to recruit 10,000 new officers. See Some 
285,000 people appeal to Turkish Police Special Opera-
tions, Hürriyet Daily News, 17 November 2016, http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/some-285000-people-ap-
peal-to-turkish-police-special-operations.aspx?page-
ID=238&nID=106241&NewsCatID=341
The dismissed officials are being replaced 
with individuals who so far have not been 
closely linked to Islamic conservative 
groups.
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force. The judiciary too was infiltrated by the 
movement’s supporters, as proved by its involve-
ment in the crackdown on the army carried out 
in 2008–201215. In these two sectors the purg-
es and the process of consolidating the govern-
ment’s control are progressing in a less refined 
manner than in the case of the army and the in-
telligence service. Police officers are subject to 
dismissals and reshuffles despite the fact that 
the police were one of the main forces whose 
involvement prevented the coup’s success16.
In the judiciary in recent months there has been 
an acceleration of measures aimed at eliminating 
people associated with Gülen and dismissing those 
employees of the judiciary who were independ-
ent of the government. Back before the coup the 
government managed to install people loyal to it 
in the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
(HSYK), the highest disciplinary body in the Turkish 
judiciary. This body is currently coordinating the 
reshuffle underway in the Turkish judiciary. The 
reshuffle mainly covers the actual and suspected 
supporters of Gülen. As a rule, specific officials 
are being replaced with individuals who are loyal 
to the present government. However, it remains 
an open question as to whether their loyalty is 
a consequence of their political views, whether it 
is their opportunism or simply an expression of 
their willingness to serve the state.
15 When Erdoğan strove to ultimately eliminate the threat 
posed by the army, the Gülen movement which cooper-
ated with him used its supporters in the courts and in 
police structures to allegedly fabricate evidence against 
officers in the Ergenekon and Balyoz court trials. See 
Dexter Filkins, Turkey’s…, op. cit.
16 The number of suspended and dismissed police officers 
is around 13,000, including around 2,500 individuals 
holding prominent posts. See Turkey purges 13,000 
police officers over failed coup, BBC, 4 October 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37551889
The media and education  
– the new (old) order
The media and education sectors are separate 
domains both subject to reconstruction. The re-
maining supporters of the Gülen movement have 
been removed from the media. In the education 
sector, 2,000 institutions (secondary schools and 
universities) were closed down. In addition, this 
sector is witnessing a crackdown on the mem-
bers of the Gülen movement, whose structures 
used to be well-developed here. The autonomy 
of universities is being limited, for example, by 
a decree pursuant to which vice-chancellors of 
universities will be appointed by the President 
(until recently they were elected).
The government’s control of the media used to 
be strong even before the coup. As a result of 
recent events the problem of self-censorship in 
secular and liberal media has increased, though 
over time it appears to have subsided. The nar-
rative according to which terrorism is the big-
gest threat (mainly Kurdish terrorism and the 
terrorist activity of the Gülen movement, which 
has been categorised as a terrorist organisation) 
continues to be valid. Anti-Western resentment 
is an inherent element of this narrative. 
The media discourse remains strongly national-
ist, elements of a uniquely Turkish Islamism are 
present mainly in pro-government media, but 
they sometimes emerge as elements of a general 
national identity. This is favourable for the army, 
for nationalist groups and for new state officials 
with a moderately conservative or secular orien-
tation. The blame for the coup is put squarely 
on Gülen, which lessens the responsibility of 
the military and additionally justifies the ineffi-
ciency of certain institutions. For example, the 
negligence which enabled Islamic State to stage 
the attack in Ankara on 10 October 2015 is inter-
preted as a consequence of acts of sabotage by 
members of the Gülen movement17.
17 10 Ekim Ankara garı saldırısının ByLock notları..., Sabah, 
10 October 2016, http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/20 
16/10/10/10-ekim-ankara-gari-saldirisinin-bylock-notlari
The government’s control of the media 
used to be strong still even before the coup, 
whereas in the education sector the final 
crackdown is currently being carried out.
7OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 228
In the education sector, more than 20,000 
teachers have been dismissed (the total num-
ber of teachers being 850,000), more than 
2,000 institutions have been closed down, and 
they are planned to be replaced with around 
3,000 new schools. Though the media sector 
was dominated by the government even before 
the coup, the education sector has not yet un-
dergone the full transformation planned by the 
government. In this sector the authorities seem 
to have less room for manoeuvre and the re-
cent purges have caused serious disturbances 
in how educational institutions work18. 
This does not mean that the government has 
abandoned its ambitions and is unaware of the 
importance of this change for the future shape 
of Turkish society. In the present situation it is 
extremely important for Erdoğan to maintain 
the feeling of threat within society and to pres-
ent himself as the only force capable of restor-
ing domestic stability. More ambitious projects 
involving a change in national identity, which 
might be achieved by changing the education 
system, need to be postponed due to the lack 
of funds and insufficient human resources19.
18 Milli Eğitim reform paketini açıkladı, Haberturk, 6 Oc-
tober 2016, http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/
haber/1306347-milli-egitimde-radikal-degisiklik
19 However, it should be noted that so far the actions car-
ried out by the authorities in this respect have been 
relatively successful, as proved by priority treatment 
of imam-hatip-type schools, which emerged as a result of 
the transformation of ordinary secondary schools, often 
against their students and their parents. Tulay Cetingulec, 
Turkish judiciary halts school firings, Al-Monitor, 24 June 
2015, http://m.almonitor.com/pulse/ru/sites/almonitor/
contents/articles/originals/2015/06/turkey-education-ju-
diciary-halts-purge-in-schools.html
Conclusions
The accelerated reconstruction of the state, 
which is happening alongside the purges which 
have been ongoing since the failure of the coup, 
generally covers all the institutions which are of 
major importance for Erdoğan. These include 
the army, the intelligence service and the struc-
tures of the Ministry of the Interior. In these 
institutions, the authorities are behaving in 
the most methodical manner and are pursuing 
a well-thought-out plan. All of these measures 
are plainly aimed at consolidating presidential 
power. The expected constitutional change will 
merely formally seal the present process. This 
process is well advanced and one might assert 
that the reconstruction is likely to endure. 
So far, the construction of the new order has 
been rather technical and institutional. The im-
plementation of more ambitious goals requir-
ing a cultural transformation has been planned 
for a longer period. Taking over the institutions 
of the state, their reorganisation, working out 
a new model of relations between the govern-
ment and the army, control of the media and 
the education sector, can be seen as prepara-
tions for the building of a new Turkey, includ-
ing the social dimension. Social consolidation 
is being achieved with nationalist and republi-
can slogans, with a slight emphasis on religious 
identity. However, the present Turkish foreign 
policy, which includes a turn towards the Mid-
dle East, Russia, and in the longer term also 
China, may become a factor fostering a further 
transformation of identity.
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The Fethullah Gülen movement (Cemaat)
An informal religious movement centred around a Muslim preacher, Fethullah Gülen (b. 1941). Its 
roots date back to the 1970’s. The teachings of its leader are based on the tradition of Turkish Sufism. 
Officially, the movement promotes the ideas of tolerance, interreligious dialogue and respect for the 
rules of liberal democracy. Unofficially, its operation aims at educating new Muslim elites to seize 
power after infiltrating the most important institutions, and then triggering the political and cultural 
transformation of Turkish society. The movement’s membership structure is informal and based on 
loyalty to the leader and subordination to those members who have a more prominent place in the 
hierarchy. Though movement has no official structure it operates in a coordinated manner. Its mem-
bers are obliged to transfer 10% of their income for the benefit of the community. The supporters 
are mainly recruited from the lowest classes of society. The movement enables them to get educated 
and then find a job in business or in public institutions. 
In practice, Fethullah Gülen is a figure overseeing an entire business and education empire with 
a global reach. Its branches operate in more than 180 countries across the world (including African 
countries, former Soviet republics, Poland, the USA). From 2001 until 2013, Cemaat functioned in al-
liance with the AKP as an instrument for building Turkish influence worldwide. The most spectacular 
example of its activity was its cooperation with the government over the issue of neutralising the in-
fluence of the army within the Turkish state. The years 2008–2012 saw court trials involving the cases 
of Ergenekon and Balyoz, in which 254 officers of the Turkish army were expelled from military service 
and 325 were sentenced to many years in prison, similar to businessmen and civil servants. In 2016 the 
Supreme Court considered these two trials to be show trials and the supporting evidence was found 
to be fabricated. The rift between the movement and the government happened around 2013, caused 
by mounting frustration among Gülen’s supporters triggered by the ever stronger position of President 
Erdoğan in Turkish politics. Its culmination was the corruption scandal of December 2013. 
Since then, the authorities have viewed the movement as a so-called parallel state. This is a reference 
to the concept of a ‘deep state’ popular in Turkish politics since at least the times of the Cold War. 
It involves an informal structure spreading across politics, the military, business and the criminal 
world, which in practice wields a major influence on the politics of the Kemalist republic. Since the 
emergence of the scandal, the authorities have been carrying out a crackdown on the movement’s 
members and supporters in the media sector, in business and in the state apparatus. A few weeks 
before the July coup the supreme command of the armed forces reportedly notified the authorities 
of several hundred officers which it had identified as members of the movement.
APPENDIX
